Dr Michael Williams, Global Governance Introductory Paper

Global Governance: scenarios for the future
Madingley Hall, Cambridge, 21-29 October 2003

Introductory Paper
by Dr Michael Williams

Introduction
Concepts of Global Governance are present in several religious faiths, especially Christianity and Islam. In many ways the Roman Empire and, much later, the Holy Roman Empire, were attempts at global governance. But the decline of the all-encompassing Catholic faith triggered by the break away of the Orthodox Church and later the Reformation dispelled any idea of a universal state. The Peace of Westphalia of 1648, which brought to an end the Thirty Years War in Europe, consolidated the concept of state sovereignty, a concept at first limited to Europe but which eventually spread to the Americas and then further afield.

Intellectually the concept of global governance continued to hold sway amongst many thinkers, notably the German philosopher Immanuel Kant who imagined a global society of republics living in close harmony. But it was to be the carnage of two world wars in the twentieth century which was to lead to renewed attention to the idea of global governance. With the establishment of the League of Nations in 1919 and the United Nations in 1945, the concept of global governance at last seemed to have found its day. Limited at first to little more than 44 states, UN membership today stands at 191 and encompasses virtually the entire globe

For decades however, the UN and the idea of global governance were constrained by the Cold War. With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the bipolar world came to an end permitting a fresh approach to global governance. Amongst other initiatives a Commission on Global Governance, coordinated by former Swedish Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson and former Commonwealth Secretary-General Shridath Ramphal, presented a report in 1995.

The UN Today
On 23 September 2003, Secretary-General Kofi Annan declared to the United Nations General Assembly that ‘we have come to a fork in the road.’ He outlined a crisis within the contemporary system of collective security based on three concerns: first, the emergence of ‘new threats’ including terrorism and weapons of mass destruction; second, a deep divergence of opinion on the significance of these threats vis-à-vis others such as disease, poverty and civil war; third, a disagreement on the most appropriate way to respond to some of these threats, brought to the fore by the Iraq crisis in early 2003. In the context of this perceived crisis, Secretary-General Annan announced the establishment of a ‘High Level Panel’ of eminent persons, charged with three tasks: to examine current and future challenges to peace and security; to consider the contribution collective security can make in addressing them; and to recommend the changes necessary to ensure effective collective action. The panel, chaired by former Thai Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun, will report back to Mr Annan by the end of 2004.

Conscious of divergent opinion on the major threats to international peace and security, the panel plans to take a ‘balanced’ and ‘non-hierarchical’ approach to threats. Its mandate lies in the field of ‘peace and security’ and it intends to examine threats from terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, organised crime and internal conflict. However, its remit extends to economic and social issues to the extent that they have a ‘direct bearing’ on peace and security. For the majority of the global population, so called ‘soft’ threats such as poverty, disease and environmental degradation are of paramount concern. Two fifths of the world lives on less than a dollar a day and 40 million people are now infected with HIV conditions, which affect fundamentally their ‘security’. Reconciling diverging views about so-called ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ threats is therefore a central challenge.

Preventing and responding to conflict
The need to take ‘soft’ threats seriously is heightened by their role in nurturing conflict. The idea that conflict is generated primarily by either ‘greed or grievance’ has been replaced by an awareness of the more complex factors involved, including: economic downturns, local or regional economic discrepancies, disputes over natural resources, environmental degradation, systems of government, ethnic politics, migration, and human rights. Recent conflict is itself a high risk factor, as indicated by the alarming tendency for post-conflict regions to re-emerge as war zones subsequently. Preventing conflict demands a multi-faceted approach that moderates economic, social and political causes, and addresses the needs of society across the cycle of conflict.

This view transformed UN activity after the end of the Cold War. Alongside the traditional ‘blue helmet’ peacekeeping model, the UN is increasingly involved in post-conflict regeneration, in ‘building’ peace with a view to preventing future conflict. The range of tasks is enormous, from disarming, demobilising and reintegrating combatants to strengthening governmental institutions and functions, and promoting democracy, the rule of law and human rights. Former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s Agenda for Peace in 1992 grappled with these new tasks and the demands they placed on the UN. Twelve years on, there is a need for an updated conceptual and institutional framework for these activities. The precise meanings of ‘peace building’ and ‘conflict prevention’ are unclear within the UN system, and are still perceived through the distorting lens of ‘peacekeeping.’ With a broad mandate to promote good governance and development as well as ‘security,’ the UN is strongly positioned to promote the conflict prevention agenda. However, a culture of conflict prevention has yet to crystallise within it.

The main restriction on the UN’s ability to prevent conflict is its lack of any central strategic capacity in this area, which is partially because of the relative novelty of the approach. There is no system or institutional support for the acquisition and deployment of conflict prevention knowledge. The UN is failing to help its missions to understand local contexts and conflict dynamics, to choose local partners and to marginalise ‘peace spoilers’. There is no system for analysing lessons learned, leading to a tendency to ‘reinvent the wheel’ in each case. There is no formal assessment of the limits of UN capacity or any systematic evaluation of the capacities existing in regional organisations, the country in question, or in member states. Finally, the UN lacks a co-ordinated early warning system to draw on available knowledge to anticipate conflict or state failure. The ‘Conflict Prevention Team’ within the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), together with increasing cooperation between DPA and UN Development Programme (UNDP), is a promising initiative. However, the UN must strive to parallel the ‘joined up thinking’ on conflict prevention which has developed elsewhere, notably the British Government’s ‘Global Conflict Prevention Pool’ or draw on the expertise and knowledge of outside institutions, such as the Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum (CPPF) at the US Social Science Research Council.

With such a strategic conflict prevention capacity, the UN would be better placed to develop and to manage a co-ordinated approach in which governments, agencies and organisations would work closely across the whole cycle of conflict. This requires that objectives and strategies are clearly established so that individual agencies are directed towards meeting defined goals. In the field, the tasks of different country teams must be more clearly delineated. For example, once the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) has undertaken the disarmament and demobilisation of combatants, UNDP may be best suited to dealing with the task of their reintegration.

Civil society groups and regional organisations are crucial to effective burden sharing. They have a relatively constant presence in the field and are hence less constrained by the infrastructural limitations of the UN. They often possess a local knowledge which the UN does not. Civil society is a vital ally for the development of democracy promotion strategies which are sensitive to context. Continuous monitoring by civil society is vital to the sustainability of peace and the rule of law. It also has a potentially important role in the development of early warning systems. Regional and sub-regional frameworks and initiatives are valuable for conflict prevention, but they require support from the UN.

In the post-Cold War era, regional organisations have also become more important in ‘peacekeeping’, narrowly conceived. Collective security frequently involves providing a UN mandate for regional forces, such as those of the European Union (EU) or Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The development of regional responsibility is positive; in particular, regional organisations have the potential to create standby capacities in regions frequently troubled by conflict. However, if regional ‘solutions’ are to be successful, innovative strategies are needed for burden sharing and capacity building especially where capacity is limited. For example, while ECOWAS has been willing to take the lead in West Africa and an African Union (AU) peacekeeping force is currently at the planning stage, both need logistical and financial assistance, especially in such areas as training and deployment. A promising development is the AU deployment in Darfur, Sudan.

The chapter VIII paradigm (regional arrangements) demands careful management to ensure that all states understand and live up to their responsibilities for conflict prevention. There is a danger that security concerns, and conflicts, especially those in Africa, may become regionalised, and left to regional organisations that have weak capacity or questionable impartiality. An assumption that regional organisations are a ‘panacea’ may, some argue, compound the limited military commitment made to underpin African security by the permanent five members of the Security Council (P5) in particular. How to foster greater P5 involvement and promote understanding of the fine balance between encouraging regional responsibility and acting to assist vulnerable people remain open questions.

At the same time, issues of shifting responsibility and political will must not distract attention from the overriding operational weaknesses in the peacekeeping field. First, there is an acute need to tackle issues of co-ordination and interoperability, which have not been adequately addressed since the Brahimi report of 2000. Where regional or multinational forces are involved, a lack of common doctrines, training, and equipment is a serious obstacle to success. The UN could fill this gap by co-ordinating training. Sound communications strategies also need to be developed in countries where peacekeepers are deployed. Second, there is an acute human resources problem within peacekeeping. With its Military Staff Committee defunct, the UN lacks professional military advisers who are responsible to the Security Council. Military personnel, rapidly deployed in crises, are often ill-prepared for the long-term task of peace building. The highly trained ‘standby forces’ suggested by Brahimi are seen as untenable by many. On the civilian side too there is a dearth of experienced staff, and a lack of training and management. More women are needed, as women are often among the most vulnerable in conflict situations. The method of and criteria for the selection of the Secretary General’s Special Representatives need updating in order to improve the UN’s poor record. Tackling conflict demands a more sustained effort on the part of both member states and the UN Secretariat.

State Sovereignty and Intervention
The United Nations is founded on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its members. Some of the key provisions of the UN Charter rest on this principle, in particular constraints placed on the use of force between states, and on interference in matters falling within the domestic jurisdiction of individual states. But these are not absolute principles. The UN Charter also makes clear the importance of respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms. The international human rights instruments and evolving international practice have confirmed the common interests in the protection of human rights. These are widely recognised as placing limits on state sovereignty.

Throughout the UN’s history, it has taken steps to counter widespread abuse of human rights, especially since the end of the Cold War in 1989. The Security Council explicitly cited humanitarian concerns as threats to the peace, in Haiti (1994), Somalia (1992), Rwanda (1994) and Eastern Zaire (1996) and again in Haiti earlier this year. The UN Security Council has also determined that widespread violations of human rights and international humanitarian law have contributed to situations threatening the peace in the former Yugoslavia and East Timor.

Where governments fail to live up to international standards in protecting human rights and the welfare of their citizens, the international community has a variety of means of encouraging better behaviour. The UN Commission on Human Rights is an important forum for ensuring international scrutiny of how far governments are measuring up to the commitments they have made. Human rights concerns now also feature regularly in decisions of the Security Council, and are increasingly integrated into the political missions mandated by the Council. The European Union has targeted sanctions against the regimes of Burma and Zimbabwe for their human rights records. In exceptional circumstances it may be necessary to use force to avert an overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe as was the case in Kosovo in 1999

There is still international disagreement on the circumstances in which such intervention on humanitarian grounds can be exercised. Tony Blair has made proposals in his Chicago speech in 1999 and in another speech in March 2004. The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty has also made concrete proposals in its report, The Responsibility to Protect. In February this year the Stockholm International Forum on Preventing Genocide also recognised that the International community must shoulder the responsibility to protect groups identified as potential victims of genocide, mass murder and ethnic cleansing. Many countries, especially in the West, want the international community to establish clearly that Humanitarian Intervention is an appropriate response in certain circumstances. The formation of the UN Secretary-General’s High Level Panel on threats to peace and security is therefore very welcome. It will hopefully mark a further acknowledgment of the right of the international community to act to prevent humanitarian catastrophe.

Combatting terrorism
Compounding the sense of ‘crisis’ at the UN is the dominance of ‘new’ threats, notably the perceived nexus of terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Terrorism is not ‘new’ per se, but it is evolving in novel and highly dangerous forms. Terrorists have proved to be capable of launching catastrophic attacks on a large scale, threatening the lives and livelihoods of huge numbers of people at a time.

Prior to 2001, responses to terrorism usually operated on a national and bilateral basis: there was no multilateral institutional architecture to combat it and the Security Council responded on a case by case basis. In the wake of 11 September 2001, Security Council resolution 1373 imposed uniform obligations on all states to suppress and to prevent support for terrorism. It established the Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC) to monitor implementation and to increase the capability of states to fight terrorism.

The relationship between counter-terrorism and human rights must be addressed. There is widespread concern that the campaign against terrorism is eroding human rights standards by re-prioritising national or state concerns about terrorists above human security issues. Security Council resolution 1456 (January 2003) requires states to ensure that measures against terrorism comply with their obligations under international human rights, refugee, and humanitarian law. However, in some countries, the scope of security legislation far exceeds the requirements of national security and allows for high levels of secrecy that protect the state from public criticism.

Even if improvements are made, the role of the UN in counter-terrorism is limited. It cannot carry out enforcement measures under its own command and it cannot monitor every possible instance of a threat which is so diffuse and clandestine. However, the UN does have the potential to act as a central coordinator of a broad counter-terrorism effort, monitoring and aligning the activities of states, regional organisations and functional agencies such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In addition, the UN has a potential comparative advantage in defining and promoting the normative and legal framework of a counter-terrorism regime.

Relevant to the bolstering of non-violent groups is the question of whether terrorism should be understood and countered with reference to ‘root causes’ such as social inequality or poor governance. The notion of ‘root causes’ is politically sensitive since some perceive it as justification for terrorism itself and for arguing against military action to tackle it. However, the campaign against terrorism could be significantly strengthened by incorporating this issue and possible responses within the conflict prevention framework. For example, a stronger rule of law or crime fighting component within peacekeeping missions could yield positive results for peace, development and for counter-terrorism. A better understanding of international markets, including off-shore financial centres and informal money transfer systems, might help counter the network of international criminals that fund both conflict and terrorism.

Weapons of mass destruction
The term ‘weapons of mass destruction’ (WMD) is used to cover a range of different weapons systems including nuclear, chemical, biological and radiological. Their use would result in grave loss of life and massive disruption to ways of life. The international treaty regimes to counter them vary considerably in strength. Some see the umbrella term ‘WMD’ as a highly politicised and myopic concept that masks crucial differences between the different categories of weapons. It is argued each demands different responses, requires different preventative measures, and could lead to different possible roles for the UN.

The threat of nuclear war has subsided since the end of the Cold War, as many states with nuclear programmes have chosen a cooperative path towards disarmament. However, the existence of covert networks of technology and ‘know-how’ exchange, such as that of the Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan, presents considerable dangers. First is the fear that a ‘rogue’ state or states without nuclear weapons programmes could acquire such weapons in the future. Second is the possibility of weapons being acquired by non-state actors, especially terrorists, because they have access to these markets, the necessary purchasing power, and the capacity to use the weapons. It is increasingly important to understand the links between terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and organised crime.

In the light of these problems there is a need to re-examine the multilateral nuclear non-proliferation regime. First, means are inadequate to enforce the rules of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). It seems, following the North Korean example, that states can withdraw from the NPT without fear of reprisal. Second, national and international systems for tracking nuclear weapons need improving in order to diminish the risks of certain states or non-state actors acquiring them. Some call for the Proliferation Security Initiative to be expanded and internationalised. Third, the emphasis on the supply side of the proliferation equation must be balanced by attention to the demand side, the question of why states perceive WMD as necessary to their security. Finally, there is a need to rediscover the cause of disarmament, which since the end of the Cold War seems to have been neglected.

The UN has a poor record of fulfilling its responsibilities in the nuclear area. The UN Security Council has responded weakly to threats of WMD and has failed to grapple with long-term issues. The Security Council has a mandate to regulate armaments under Article 26 of the charter. In addition, it is explicitly mentioned in the NPT and it has agreed to act as the security guarantor for those countries that sign the treaty. To fulfil its potential, it must grapple more consistently with the problem of proliferation and become better integrated with technical agencies such as the IAEA and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), (for example by arranging annual reporting by them to the Security Council). These agencies lack enforcement capacity without Security Council backing.

Biological weapons (BW) present a different range of problems due to their links to naturally occurring disease. The risks they pose are less containable than other weapons systems since disease rapidly crosses borders in the modern world. The weapons are potentially attractive to non-state actors because the materials and technology for manufacturing them are cheap, readily available, and easily hidden within the operations of ‘normal’ laboratories. It is very difficult to identify who is seeking BW, prevent their access to materials, or verify adherence to international codes. Verification mechanisms are needed to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention. However, defence against BW threats also requires the development of antidotes, vaccines, and the systems of care to deliver them.

The UN is well-suited to co-ordinate the work of various national and functional agencies in the biological area and to be the locus for information sharing. It could also have a critical role in developing drugs and vaccines and in designing impartial strategies for the stockpiling and global distribution of these drugs in a crisis. However, the current structure of responsibilities is hampering the capacity of the UN to fulfil this role: while the Security Council reacts periodically to crises, the World Health Organisation (WHO) has to balance its conflicting public health and regulatory roles. A new body, either alongside or part of the WHO, is necessary to handle BW threats. Meanwhile the WHO needs strengthening both in the field and at headquarters so that its role in the early recognition of disease is extended to include deliberately engineered epidemics.

The UN is well placed to be a forum for negotiation and norm promotion. It needs to make the use of WMD unthinkable, to emphasise the responsibilities of individuals and states and to develop codes of conduct useful for regulating private actors and industry.

A new framework for collective security
In a world in which the identification of threats itself causes disagreement a framework for collective security must mobilise states around a renewed sense of interdependence. The threats themselves are clearly interdependent. Terrorism and international crime thrive in states which are unable to control them, and where circumstances nurture support for them. Pressure on states to control such threats is useless when the state lacks effective control over its territory and population. This said, by undermining the state and the economy in developing countries, terrorism is also a threat to development, as well as to human rights. The concept of the ‘failed’ state is one potential pivot connecting ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ threats. Countries are interdependent in that both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ threats demand global solutions.

The UN is uniquely placed to forge a response to these different kinds of threats, as the only global institution mandated to manage both traditional ‘security’ concerns and social, economic, and development challenges. However, in order to meet this challenge, it must elaborate a new set of guiding principles for the twenty-first century; a ‘compact’ that aligns campaigns against terrorism and proliferation with a renewed commitment to development. This ‘deal’ might be epitomised via a new conceptual framework oriented around ‘human security,’ ‘peace, security and safety’ or ‘sustainable security.’

However, as the Secretary-General has spelt out, the problem is not simply based on a disagreement on the threats but also derives from the question of how to respond to them. At the core of the UN Charter is the rule that force is prohibited except when carried out in self-defence or with Security Council authorisation. While some are fiercely defensive against any form of ‘doctrinal mutation’, others argue there is an urgent need to grapple with the viability of the current rules and to formulate new understandings. Is the use of force for humanitarian purposes legitimate without the consent of a state? Under what conditions might it be permissible? What is the meaning of self-defence? Should states be able to act ‘pre-emptively’ against highly dangerous threats?

Some argue that the Security Council ought to be further guided in its decisions to authorise the use of force. Article 39 grants the Security Council the right to determine threats to international peace and security and to decide the response. Article 42 provides for military intervention to be authorised by the Security Council. Some suggest that its deliberations under Article 42 should be in accordance with a set of criteria based on shared principles. The report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, underlining the ‘responsibility to protect’, provides one possible set of guidelines. These are based on just cause, right intention, exhaustion of other options, proportionality, reasonable prospects, and right authority.

Institutional and procedural change
Institutional change is a divisive issue but the High Level Panel plans to recommend it in as far as it is necessary to bring about policy change. Security Council reform is particularly controversial. It is claimed by some that, since its present composition does not reflect the contemporary balance of political and economic power, the legitimacy of its decisions is limited. If the Security Council is to be given some responsibilities regarding ‘human security,’ the developing world has a legitimate claim to increased representation. This is an issue that the Open Ended Working Group on Security Council Reform has discussed for eleven years with no positive result. Moreover, as the one meaningful decision-making body within the UN system, a ‘botched’ reform of the Security Council could endanger the UN itself.

There are a number of ways to improve Security Council procedure that require no amendment to the Charter. First, Security Council procedure needs refashioning away from its present ‘reactive’ stance. It must pay more attention to the full scope of the conflict cycle, promulgate strategies addressed to conflict prevention and peace building and target a range of intersecting security issues. It must halt emergent threats through innovative policy, for example using targeted sanctions. Second, to increase the effectiveness of the Security Council, it could create subsidiary organs analogous to the CTC, addressing proliferation and human security. This would also send a powerful message to the majority of humanity for whom poverty is the primary threat. Third, Security Council proceedings need to be made yet more open. Non-member states must be engaged in order to reinforce support for Council decisions. The involvement of regional organisations is necessary to encourage regional responsibilities but also to build capacity for such responsibility. Fourth, the Security Council needs to streamline its decisions so that its pronouncements become more meaningful.

The General Assembly, as an organ with universal membership, has inevitable limitations as a decision-making body. The need to generate consensus across the membership tends towards a lowest common denominator outcome. Meanwhile, the negotiating system between blocs obscures areas of common interest across the membership as a whole. The prospects for overcoming these problems appear limited. More feasible reforms include strengthening the office of the President by lengthening the terms of the Presidency, and streamlining the General Assembly’s agenda by treating matters thematically.

The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) has failed as a functional body to the point where its credibility is severely tarnished. Too large to be effective, yet too small to be truly ‘representative,’ its reform has been attempted before to little avail. Some maintain that a reformed ECOSOC, reduced to around 21 members, could play a leadership role in the areas of peace building and conflict prevention. Others predict that an institution with such a negative image cannot be revived. What is clear is that its dysfunctional nature is a severe constraint on the provision of leadership in the development and conflict prevention fields, perpetuating a fragmented and competitive system in which departments and agencies compete for mandates and resources. A more integrated approach might take the form of an ‘International Development Council,’ responsible for guiding funds and programmes and placing strong emphasis on the impact of trade on development.

The UN Secretariat also has large scope for reform, although there is due recognition of the efforts the current Secretary-General has made in this direction. Although the Secretariat lacks resources in certain areas, this is not the overall problem so much as the quality of people and management systems. Talented and high-achieving individuals within the Secretariat are hindered by a structure that: awards posts and permanent contracts on political grounds; fails to recruit and retain the best people; and perpetuates a culture of ‘self-righteous entitlement’. Management skills must be a priority and the recent move towards results-based promotion should be encouraged. There is a need to address the ageing demographic of an institution, which is failing to draw on the best young people in order to replace the older generation of leaders. Finally, the panel should consider how the role of the Secretary-General could be enhanced, by improving the recruitment process and support for the incumbent. The Secretary-General’s role could also be strengthened through greater use of Article 99 of the Charter.

However, many believe that the revival of collective security requires change not only to the principal organs but also to the fundamental structure of relationships within the UN as a whole. A new conceptual framework oriented around ‘human security’ and interdependence depends on engagement across the north-south divide, an engagement not encouraged by the current relationship between Security Council and ECOSOC. Many argue a better system of dialogue would result from bringing the G20 mechanism, an informal forum which comprises the G8, Australia, several emerging-market states and which has close links to the Bretton Woods institutions, into the UN. Such a body would be ideally placed to forge a consensus on ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ threats. Ideas on its specific institutional form range from an ‘Economic Security Council’ or a ‘Human Security Committee’ linked to the Security Council, to the more limited institutionalisation of Security Council outreach by inviting G20 participation in Security Council working groups. The G77 are likely to resist such a change since they perceive ECOSOC to be ‘their’ arena. However, introducing the G20 mechanism into the UN might be regarded by the G77 as a challenge to be met. If no agreement can be forged on a new institutional structure, then many issues may be debated outside of the UN in the future.

Delivering the panel’s message
In defining an agenda for reform, the panel must strike a fine balance between political realism and a visionary approach. On the one hand, it is important that the panel’s recommendations are viable in the short-term, recognising the sclerotic nature of the UN and the constraints on decision making within its organs. A report that is overly ambitious could have little impact and may actually damage the credibility of the UN further. Yet too modest an approach will undermine the panel’s prospects of defining a future agenda. What is certain is that the panel must build momentum for its vision by including some immediately ‘do-able’ reforms together with more long-term or controversial ones. And it must be selective in its recommendations in order to initiate a focussed reform process that has a chance of success.

Although the panel’s report will be addressed to the Secretary-General, it is important for the panel to engage in a process of outreach to member states and the media both during and after its compilation. Building political consensus requires accommodating the broad range of threats perceived by the international community but the practical advantages of reform should not be lost in this process. For the United States especially, there must be tangible benefits. Reform must enhance awareness of and responses to threats. It must facilitate burden sharing by strengthening the UN in areas where it has a comparative advantage. It must enhance the potential relevance of the UN in the promotion of democracy and good governance. These benefits must be marketed specifically to the US Congress, which is responsible for decisions that may make or break the reforms. Meanwhile the costs must also be recognized; identifying methods for mobilising resources around the new agenda might considerably promote it. Lastly, the panel’s report must be thoroughly grounded in the incentive structure behind the reform process. It must pay attention to the importance of perceived fairness and assess strategies for building trust, in order to initiate dialogue and build consensus.

International Financial Institutions
So far we have discussed global governance almost entirely with reference to the UN. No discussion would be complete without looking at the international financial institutions, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, the so-called Bretton Woods institutions, who celebrated their sixtieth anniversary earlier this month. Two years ago the Group of Seven leading industrialised nations began a strategic review of the IMF and the World Bank. Rather than a root and branch reform of the institutions, the review is expected to lead to incremental changes.

If the political world inhabited by the UN has changed enormously over the past sixty years, the economic world has changed almost beyond recognition. Not only has the distribution of world economic power shifted substantially, making the distribution of power within the institutions seem anachronistic, the financial system has been transformed. The fixed exchange rates and capital controls that formed the basis of the financial system of the late 1940s have long been swept away and private capital flows have grown dramatically. Relative to the size of global capital flows and GDP, the IMF – created as a fire fighter for international crises – is much smaller than when it was created. Resources at the disposal of the IMF and World Bank have in no way kept pace with the growth of world GDP. Default by leading Latin American countries such as Brazil and Argentina would greatly strain the resources of the IMF. It seems likely that the G8 review will recommend a trimming of the shopping list of conditions attached to its loans.

The debate about lending practices is no less intense at the World Bank. Many of the Bank’s main borrowers can quite easily raise money from the capital markets. Many would argue that it makes little sense to lend to a country like China, with $400 billion in foreign exchange reserves and ready access to financial markets. It would seem to make sense to loan to countries that have no access to the markets but leading figures in the Bank are not keen on this. Some argue that the Bank should give up lending altogether and concentrate on grants.

While progress on some of these issues is likely, as with the UN Security Council, the overarching issue of representation at the Bretton Woods institutions remains a hot potato. The most obvious anomalies are the over-representation of some European nations and the under-representation of some large developing economies such as China, India and Brazil. Pressure for change in voting rights in the financial institutions, however, may well be addressed before the even more vexed question of Security Council reform.

The World Trade Organisation (WTO) is one of the youngest international organisations, being established in 1995. While it is less than a decade old, its predecessor – the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) – was, like the IMF and World Bank, established in the wake of the Second World War.

The past 50 years have seen an exceptional growth in world trade. Total trade in 2000 was 22-times the level of 1950. GATT and the WTO have helped to create a strong and prosperous trading system contributing to unprecedented growth - although the impact of this growth and the distribution of the wealth it has created is highly controversial, as can be seen in the anti-globalization movement and the emergence of the World Social Forum.

The system was developed through a series of trade negotiations, or rounds, held under GATT. The first rounds dealt mainly with tariff reductions but later negotiations included other areas such as anti-dumping and non-tariff measures. The last round – the 1986-94 Uruguay Round – led to the WTO’s creation. In 2000, new talks started on agriculture and services. These have now been incorporated into a broader agenda launched at the fourth WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar, in November 2001. This Doha Development Agenda (DDA), adds negotiations and other work on non-agricultural tariffs, trade and environment, WTO rules such as anti-dumping and subsidies, investment, competition policy, trade facilitation, transparency in government procurement, intellectual property, and a range of issues raised by developing countries as difficulties they face in implementing the present WTO agreements.

The DDA suffered a serious blow when negotiations at the Cancun ministerial broke down in September 2003. The immediate cause was disagreement on the “Singapore issues” (launching of WTO rules in four new areas), but differences on agriculture were the main underlying reason. Since January, WTO members have been working to agree “frameworks”; an agreement to bank progress made so far and move the Round forward before US elections and the change of Commission make progress impossible later this year. The framework negotiations have been characterised as “talks about talks” – effectively about setting the boundaries within which detailed negotiations will take place. Many were pessimistic about the chances of achieving anything this year.

The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) reforms of June 2003 and April this year were crucial in giving the EU room for manoeuvre. The Commission claims it has succeeded in protecting the CAP, as the agreement requires no reforms beyond those already envisaged for sugar. However, the framework is only a broad outline to which much more detail will need to be added; this will certainly involve difficult negotiations on agriculture, with Brazil and other developing countries, as well as NGOs, keeping up the pressure for further CAP reform.

The agreement on a framework reached on 1 August at Geneva has pulled the Doha Trade Round back from the brink of failure, and gets us to the point we should have reached at Cancun. The final text was better than expected. Failure to agree would have meant no progress until at least next spring, and would have lead to disillusionment with the Round and the multilateral process. The outcome in Geneva was hailed as a significant victory by developing countries like India and Brazil. The next WTO Ministerial will be held in Hong Kong in December 2005.

For the time being the WTO is back on track. In theory more ‘democratic’ than the IMF or the World Bank (each of the 148 members has one vote, regardless of size or economic strength), the WTO is often cumbersome and consensus driven. Nevertheless, despite the controversies it gives rise to, it is one of the international organisations with the most legitimacy and with enough teeth to play the driving role in multilateral trade negotiations.

International Judicial Institutions
No discussion of global governance would be complete without commenting on the remarkable developments in international criminal justice since the end of the Cold War. In May 1993, following gross human rights violations in Croatia and Bosnia, the Security Council established the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). The following year, after the genocide in Rwanda, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) was established. The first tribunals of their kind since the Nuremberg Tribunal of 1946, ICTY and ICTR broke new ground in showing that criminal justice was no longer constrained by state sovereignty.

Within a few years of the founding of ICTY and ICTR, a further breakthrough occurred with the Rome Conference of 1998, which led to the coming into force of the statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). As of 27 September 2004, some 97 countries, just over half of the membership of the UN, had become States Parties to the ICC. As is well known, the United States refused to become a member of the Court. It is unlikely that a Democratic Administration would take a different attitude from that of the Bush Administration. It is also worth noting that a number of other significant countries including Russia, Japan, China, India and Pakistan have not become parties to the Court.

The ICC is the first ever permanent, treaty-based, international criminal court established to promote the rule of law and ensure that the gravest international crimes do not go unpunished. The Rome Statute of the Court sets out the Court’s jurisdiction, structure and functions providing for their entry into force 60 days after 60 states have ratified or acceded to it. The Statute entered into force on 1 July 2002. Anyone who commits any of the crimes under the Statute after this date will be liable for prosecution by the Court.

Conclusions
When Kofi Annan spoke in September 2003 of the UN being at a fork in the road he was referring specifically to the fortunes of the global institution and the crisis that had beset it since the Iraq war. The same could be said, mutatis mutandis, of global governance as a whole.

At first sight the institutions of global governance, the UN and the Bretton Woods institutions, appear to have changed little since 1945. Many countries have not ratified crucial treaties defining the future of global governance such as the Rome Statute on the International Criminal Court or the Kyoto Accords. Global governance seems inadequate in the face of the threats and challenges posed by terrorism, HIV/Aids, poverty and ethnic and religious strife. As crisis after crisis has shown, most recently Darfur, the world’s nation-states find it hard to rise to the world’s transnational problems. Above all, the very concept of multilateralism, the cornerstone of global governance, appears to be under threat from the world’s strongest power, the United States.

Such a negative view, however, masks the very considerable progress that has been made, especially since the end of the Cold War. In the first instance, the institutions of global governance, the UN and other bodies, are truly inclusive. At the outset in 1945 less than fifty countries were members of the UN. China was not a member until 1971 and large swathes of Africa were also not represented until the 1970s. In the 1990s and more recently, the former republics of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, as well as new countries like Eritrea and East Timor, have become members. Even Switzerland, which held itself back from the UN for decades, has now joined. In 2004 the UN can be said to be truly global in its membership. Even a new organization, like the WTO, already boasts 148 members or about three quarters of the membership of the UN as a whole.

Moreover, if we look at progress since the end of the Cold War less than fifteen years ago we see quite remarkable changes. In that period we have seen the creation of new institutions such as the WTO and the ICC. Few at the start of the 1990s imagined the creation of specific international tribunals to prosecute those guilty of war crimes in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, let alone the Rome Conference of 1998 which led to the establishment of the International Criminal Court. Institutional advance has not been lacking.

Furthermore, we should not forget the extraordinary development of global civil society enhanced by easier travel, the Internet, the spread of democracy and globalization. The development of NGOS has, in this respect, been quite remarkable. The Ford Foundation has estimated that there are 30,000 international non-governmental organizations alone. In the modern world, civil society plays an increasingly important role in global governance through NGOs. Examples abound: Amnesty International has more staff and funds than the UN’s Human Rights Commission; the Red Cross, Greenpeace and the World Wildlife Fund are bigger than most intergovernmental organisations such as the WTO, UNCTAD or UNIDO. The strengths of NGOs are now well documented, from their presence at international conferences in Rio (1992) and Johannesburg (2002) to their stunning successes in marshalling international campaigns that led to the Kyoto environmental accord, the 1997 Ottawa Treaty banning land mine use and the creation in 2002 of the International Criminal Court. The UN and other international institutions have recognized this and established regular consultative mechanisms with NGOs. This interface between international institutions and global civil society has assisted the development of global solutions to questions of justice and human rights, disease and development. It is clear from these developments that NGOs will play a critical role in the future evolution of global governance.

We meet in Cambridge at the end of October at a critical point for the future of global governance only weeks after Russia has confirmed that it will ratify the Kyoto Accord, on the eve of perhaps the most important American election for decades and just weeks before the Secretary-General’s High Level Panel reports on the future of the UN.